We examine the role of information-based stock trading in affecting the risk-incentive relation. By incorporating an endogenous informed trading into an optimal incentive contracting model, we analytically show that, apart from reducing incentives, a greater risk increases the level of information-based trading which consequently enhances executive incentives and offsets the negative risk-incentive relation. We calibrate the model and find that the economic magnitude of this incentive-enhancement effect is significant. Our empirical test using real-world executive compensation data lends strong support to the model prediction. Our results suggest that principals (boards of directors) should consider underlying stock trading characteristics when structuring executive incentives.
Introduction
A standard principal-agent model predicts a negative relation between risk and incentives (Holmstrom 1979; and Holmstrom and Milgrom 1987) . Uncertainty of an economy adds observation errors to agents' performance measures and dampens agents' incentives to act in the principal's best interest. Yet, empirical evidence in support of this prediction is mixed. 1 Theoretically, both Prendergast (2002) and Raith (2003) have argued that the effects of uncertainty on incentives are much more involved: apart from reducing incentives outright, increased uncertainty may also affect incentive provision via other channels.
In this paper we examine the role of information-based stock trading in affecting executive incentives. We propose that information-based stock trading driven by increased uncertainty enhances incentives and complicates the risk-incentive relation. All else equal and on the margin, a greater uncertainty attracts more informed stock traders and motivates more information-based trading in the market. As a result, the stock trading impounds more information into a firm's stock price, which the principal can use to better incentivize his manager. We characterize this information channel of incentive provision due to the heightened uncertainty analytically. We also quantify its economic significance both numerically and empirically.
Our motivations for this inquiry are two-fold. First, optimal incentive contracting calls for principals to use all useful information. The stock market works as an information aggregator and sends principals meaningful signals to better incentivize executives. The intensity of information production, which is largely determined by stock market microstructure, profoundly affects managerial incentives and potentially sheds light on the risk-incentive relation in the principalagent literature. This perspective has been relatively under-studied. Second, our analysis might generate valuable managerial implications. The business world widely uses pay-for-performance schemes to align interests of managers with interests of principals (i.e., shareholders, boards of directors). The efficacy of such incentive mechanism might depend on whether and how much principals consider the business environment, such as the firms' risk profile and the characteristics of stock trading, when structuring managerial incentives. Our analysis provides useful evidence from which boards can lean to better manage executive compensation.
We begin by proposing a model that combines a standard optimal contracting process with a Kyle (1985) type of stock trading process. 2 In our model, the information content in the stock price is endogenously determined and depends only on market characteristics such as risk, liquidity, precision of private signals, and reservation value of becoming an informed trader. We analytically decompose the equilibrium impact of risk on incentives into two offsetting effects: one measures the standard risk-incentive tradeoff effect given certain amount of information-based trading, and the other reflects the incentive enhancement effect due to the information-based trading induced by a higher level of risk. An increase in uncertainty, rendering incentives more costly, makes prices relatively more informative by inducing more traders to become informed, which in turn enhances incentives and dampens the negative effect of risk on incentives.
We numerically examine the economic significance of the incentive enhancement effect driven by increased information-based trading. Using real-world executive compensation data and stock market data we calibrate our model with an internally consistent multi-step approach. Our calibration analysis demonstrates the following: (1) the pay-performance sensitivity equals 0.042, representing a $42 increase in CEO compensation per $1000 increase in shareholder value; (2) the manager's disutility (in certainty equivalent measure) from effort equals about 2.10% of the average market value; (3) the profit of informed trading is about 4.18% of the average market value; (4) about 20% of variation in aggregate market orders is due to liquidity orders; and (5) the incentiveenhancement effect due to increased uncertainty offsets 20%-30% of the incentive-reduction effect and contributes significantly to social welfare improvement.
We also empirically test our model prediction by using the actual compensation data over 1992-2005. We use Duarte and Young's (2009) adjusted probability of informed trading (PIN), which is developed from an extended version of the Easley, Kiefer, O'Hara, and Paperman (1996) model, as a proxy for the amount of information-based stock trading. We decompose this PIN measure 2 Our model shares similar motivations of Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) , but there exists one important theoretic difference in the structure of the information market. Their argument relies crucially on the costly collection of private information by a single large risk-neutral insider who acts as an information monopolist and chooses the precision of signals impounded into stock prices. Our model assumes a dispersed information market which is open and accessible (with a cost). Due to the competition among informed speculators, the information content in stock prices is endogenously determined by satisfying an equilibrium condition that the marginal profit and the marginal cost of information collection are equal. Moreover, as we elaborate in Section 2, certain technical features make it less feasible to calibrate Holmstrom and Tirole's model and empirically test for their model prediction.
into two orthogonal components: one is risk-related and the other not. Using both the median regressions and the ordinary least square (OLS) regressions with fixed effects, we examine the effects of the two components on CEO incentives. We find that the risk-driven information-based trading leads to improved CEO incentives, partially canceling the reduction in CEO incentives caused by the heightened risk. According to the OLS regression results, a one-standard-deviation increase in risk causes a direct reduction of CEO incentives by $1.506 and an indirect improvement in CEO incentives by $0.656, which represents a 43% offset of the negative risk-incentive effect.
Using the median regression results, we document that a similar change in the level of risk causes an 80% offset of the negative risk-incentive effect.
These results have useful managerial implications. Our findings, by pinpointing the impacts of information-based trading on executive incentives, suggest that, as long as the underlying stock trading process can impound more information into stock prices, pay-for-performance schemes are still able to incentivize managers even in an uncertain environment. Traditional incentive pay focuses less attention on differentiating between value created due to market-wide factors and to managerial individual efforts. Executives might be rewarded regardless of their merits -e.g., it happened during the stock market run-up of the late 1990s -and top-performing executives might be penalized if their tenure coincides with a bear market. Principals can better structure managerial incentives if they actively promote information-based trading and use the information contained in stock prices to filter out factors outside the control of executives and the return expected by shareholders. Another related implication is that incentive pay may not work perfectly to the interests of principals if firms operate in a highly uncertain environment with inefficient stock market information production, e.g., in an illiquid market or an emerging market with a high level of volatility but a low level of information disclosure. An empirical test using international data might help illuminate this point.
Our paper contributes to several strands of related literature. First, our paper adds to the burgeoning executive compensation literature in several ways. Empirical studies on executive compensation have exploded since the early 1990s (Murphy 1999 ), but there have been a paucity of attempts on model calibrations. Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia (1991) and Haubrich (1994) are among the first to calibrate the agency models. Some recent works include Hall and Murphy (2002) , Hall and Knox (2004) , and Dittmann and Maug (2007) . In a framework that embeds endogenous informed trading with executive compensation, we calibrate parameters key to the optimal contracting model and document calibrated values broadly consistent with empirical evidence and in support of the agency theory. Also, although the bulk of executive compensation is equity based, the linkage of executive compensation to stock trading and stock price informativeness is yet to be mapped out. We illustrate, both theoretically and empirically, the effects of informationbased stock trading on managerial incentives, and in particular, the risk-incentive relation.
Second, our paper is closely related to a large literature that studies the effect of stock price informativeness on corporate actions and corporate control. 3 The theoretical part of our paper is most closely related to Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) , but there are some major differences between our model and theirs (see Footnote 2 and Section 2). Another closely related theoretic work is Faure-Grimaud and Gromb (2004), who show that by impounding more information into a stock price, public trading increases the incentives of a firm's large shareholder ("insider") to engage in value-increasing activities. Our paper differs from theirs in several ways: they focus on the insider's incentives that is governed by the insider's stake, but we focus on CEO incentives that are structured by the incentive contract; moreover, besides the theoretical reasoning, we also conduct the numerical analysis and empirical tests. There are also several related empirical studies. Third, we propose an important channel through which stock market efficiency improves economic efficiency. Dow and Gorton (1997) and Dow and Rahi (2003) emphasize the information role of the stock market in guiding managers' investment decisions. We however focus on the information role of the stock market in structuring executive incentives. Also, to the extent that executive compensation is one particular corporate governance mechanism, our study explicitly examines the relation between corporate governance and stock market microstructure.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 characterizes our model and analytically decomposes the risk-incentive relation into two offsetting effects. Section 3 conducts the model calibration and the social welfare analysis. Section 4 presents empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
The Model
Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) (HT, hereafter) are among the first to combine the stock price formation process with the optimal contracting process. HT show that a firm's stock price incorporates performance information that cannot be extracted from the firm's current or future profit data. The amount of information contained in the stock price is useful for structuring managerial incentives. An illiquid market makes the stock price less informative and thus reduces the benefits of stock market monitoring. Although HT highlights the importance of market microstructure in inducing executive incentives, it is not easy to calibrate the HT model and build an empirical analysis. 4 We thus introduce a parsimonious model that links the information-based stock trading to an optimal incentive contracting process. We use the model to demonstrate the effects of information-based trading on the risk-incentive relation and to motivate our quantitative research.
Economy
We begin with a single-period model with two points of time, indexed =0, 1. The period is further divided into several stages. We summarize the time line of the model in Figure 1 At the initial point of time 0, a publicly held firm is established and shares are issued on the firm's future cash flow. The terminal payoff of the firm at time 1 is e  =  + , where  is the earning determined by managerial actions, and  is a noise term, representing factors outside the manager's control. We assume that  follows a normal distribution with mean zero and variances   .
At stage 1, the firm owner (the principal) hires one manager (the agent). The owner writes a compensation contract on two performance measures, the stock price  and the firm's terminal payoff e :
where  represents the fixed salary,  and  capture the sensitivities of the manager's compensation to  and e , respectively. The compensation contract in equation (1) follows a commonly adopted form in the literature (see, e.g., Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1987; Holmstrom and Tirole, 1993; and Baiman and Verrecchia, 1995) . Given the compensation contract, the manager chooses an effort level  ∈ [0 ∞), which is unobservable. 5 At stage 2, the stock market opens. We assume that the manager is barred from trading. 6 A stock market investor can observe an informative but non-contractible signal on the firm's future value at a cost. She does not search for the costly private signal on  unless her expected value of doing so exceeds her reservation value . The costly signal acquired by an informed investor  is  +   , where   is i.i.d. with mean zero and variance   . Informed trader  submits a market order that is linear in her signal, ( +   ). Both informed and uninformed traders submit their orders to the market maker who cannot tell whether an order is from an informed trader or from an uninformed trader. We assume that the total liquidity demand (of uninformed traders) in the market is  and  is a normally distributed variable with mean zero and variance   . We also assume that there are  informed investor and  is an endogenous number. The total order flow observed by the market maker is  =  + P  =1 (  ) + . The competitive market maker, given the aggregate order flow , sets a price such that  =  [e |]. 7 At time 1, the payoff is realized, the incentive contract is honored, and the firm is liquidated.
The resulting liquidation proceeds are distributed between the manager and the principal.
All players but the manager are risk-neutral. The manager's preference is represented by a negative exponential utility function over her compensation  with the (absolute) risk aversion coefficient . Her cost of choosing the effort  is denoted as () = 1 2  2 . The cost is measured in money and is independent of the manager's wealth. Given her choice of effort , the manager's evaluation of the normally distributed income  can be represented in the certainty equivalent measure as follows:
Equilibrium
We solve a rational-expectation equilibrium in which the players in the real sector, i.e., the principal and the manager, use the information contained in the stock price and the realized payoff to make decisions, and both the real sector and the stock market attain equilibrium.
We first solve the stock market equilibrium. The market maker sets a linear price schedule of the form  =  +  (Kyle 1985) . Using standard techniques, we obtain the equilibrium value of 
The expected profit of an informed trader is given by
. A potential trader searches for the private signal if and only if the expected profit from doing so exceeds her reservation value . The equilibrium number of informed traders  is determined by
We then analyze the incentive contract. Following Holmstrom and Tirole (1993), we transform the wage function into the following equivalent normalized form:
where =  +  * , = e  −  * , and  * is the equilibrium effort level. Note that equation (4) is just a reparametrization of equation (1) at the hypothesized equilibrium value. The contracting analysis becomes much analytically easier with the normalized wage equation, so we build our analysis on this transformed compensation function from this point onwards. One way to interpret equation (4) is that besides the stock price  , the principal observes another signal,, and include the signal into the compensation contract. The zero-mean can be understood as a signal on the firm's reported earnings, on which the principal also relies to better detect the managerial effort. 8 Using the standard agency-theory approach, we have:
Lemma 1 In the rational-expectations equilibrium, the compensation contract can be re-written as
 () . The equilibrium pay-performance sensitivity  is given by
where  ≡ ( ). The equilibrium effort level  * is given by
In equilibrium,  is negative because  is positive (see Lemma 3). The intuition is similar to the relative performance argument in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) . By construction, acts as one signal, in addition to the stock price  , to help the principal better extract the information about the managerial effort. If is high then the principal knows that the exogenous shock is positive, and hence lower the agent's compensation.
In a different framework to analyze the use of reported accounting earnings and stock price as basis for managerial compensation, Baiman and Verrecchia (1995) obtain a similar result: the negative weight on reported earnings signal in the manager's contract is used to imperfectly extract the manager's actual effort from the stock price.
 () . We can view  as an aggregate performance index built on two performance measures,  and. The compensation scheme in our model is hence based on an aggregate measure that captures various aspects of a firm's performance. 9 8 In order to interpret   as a reliable signal on reported accounting earnings, we have to assume that the manager truthfully reports earnings. Factoring the manager's incentives to misreport earnings only makes noisier but does not change our results qualitatively because, by construction, only plays the role of a signal. 9 Executive compensation contracts in real world are oftentimes written on a variety of performance measures such
Properties of Equilibrium
Lemma 2 The number of informed traders,  , increases as the uncertainty of the firm's cash flow,
The intuition behind Lemma 2 is as follows. Each potential informed trader engages in a strategic activity in this environment. Given the other potential traders' actions, her expected profit  from collecting the costly private signal and becoming an informed trader increases as the uncertainty of the firm's cash flow   increases, which can been easily shown since
Other potential outsiders will follow the same strategy and choose to become informed. Thus, the equilibrium number of informed traders increases as the firm's risk, measured by the firm's cash flow variance   , increases.
Lemma 3
The correlation coefficient  is positive. Moreover, both  2 and  ( ) are increasing functions of the underlying uncertainty   .
Lemmas 1-3 imply that as the underlying uncertainty   increases, two opposing effects arise:
(1) an outright decrease in managerial incentives; and (2) improved incentives caused by increased information-based trading. The overall effect thus depends on which effect dominates in equilibrium.
The overall response of the optimal payperformance sensitivity  to the change in the fundamental uncertainty   is given by
where
and
as economics value added (EVA), return on invested capital (ROIC), total returns to shareholders (TRS), and etc. The aggregate measure we propose in equation (5) thus reflects the features of the incentive pay scheme in real world.
. Moreover, the   term strictly dominates the  term, and
Proposition 1 shows that two offsetting effects arise out of a growing uncertainty. The   term measures the direct effect of an increase in uncertainty on incentives for a fixed number of informed traders. In sharp contrast, the  term reflects the effect of an increasing amount of information-based stock trading resulting from a greater uncertainty. As the uncertainty rises, more potential traders collect information and trade on the information (Lemma 2). Through trading, more information will be incorporated into the stock price and the correlation between the stock price and the cash flow increases (Lemma 3). The  term thus characterizes the effect of the information-based trading on incentives.
Combining Proposition 1 with Lemma 1, we obtain Proposition 2 As the cash flow uncertainty increases, both the equilibrium pay-performance sensitivity and the equilibrium effort level decrease. The magnitude of the decrease is smaller for firms with a high level of information-based stock trading (or a high  effect) than for firms with a low level of information-based stock trading (or a low  effect).
Proposition 2 implies a negative risk-incentive relation even after taking into account the  effect.  equals zero if  is a constant (i.e., no risk-driven information-based trading). When  is zero, the   term alone, measuring the traditional risk-incentive tradeoff, captures the overall risk-incentive relation. In the presence of information-based stock trading, the  effect due to a greater uncertainty offsets the negative risk-incentive relation.
Numerical Analysis
We use real-world stock market data and executive compensation data to calibrate key parameters of the model. We then use the calibrated parameters to gauge the economic significance of the information-based stock trading via a welfare analysis.
Calibration: Baseline Values
Exogenous parameters in this model consist of the absolute risk aversion coefficient , the parameter on manager's disutility of effort , the cash flow variance   , the signal noise variance   , the liquidity order variance   , and the reservation utility of becoming an informed trader . We normalize   ,   and  by the scale of   and define  ≡
We calibrate the parameters of our model based on a data set merging the CRSP, Compustat, Therefore, we calculate the volatility in trading volume as the time-series standard deviation in trading volume for each firm over the sample period. The cross-sectional average of the standard deviations in the trading volume is 101.85 (million shares), so we set the variance of the total order flow   = 10185 2 = 1037367. Moreover, it is well accepted in the literature that institutional investors are informed traders, so we set the number of informed traders  to the average number of institutional investors for our sample firms, which is 164. 10 Finally, we follow the literature to choose values of the risk aversion coefficient ; we set  0 = 2 (e.g., Haubrich 1994). 11 Using a multi-step internally consistent approach (see Appendix 2), we achieve convergence in calibration when we set  0 = 0042, representing a $42 annual increase in a CEO's firm-related wealth (including options and stocks) per $1,000 increase in the shareholder wealth (Jensen and 10 There are different types of informed traders other than institutional investors in the market, such as corporate insiders, equity analysts, hedge funds, etc. Our choice for the number of informed traders may under-estimate and provide a lower bound for the number of informed traders. In unreported analysis, we also pick higher values for the number and the ensuing calibration yields qualitatively similar results. Moreover, we conduct various sensitivity analyses by choosing different values for the other parameters. All those results are qualitatively similar and are available upon request. 11 There is a typo in Haubrich (1994) , pp.274, where  is said to equal four. However, based on the assumed values for the other parameters and the implied pay-performance sensitivity of 0.00621, it can only be the case that  = 2. Murphy, 1990 ). This value is close to our sample mean (Panel A of Table 1; see also Table I of Aggarwal and Samwick 2003) as well as the OLS estimates of PPS in the literature (see, e.g., Aggarwal and Samwick 1999; Murphy 1999) . The parameter on the manager's disutility of effort,  0 , is calibrated to be 68791 − 6. As a result, the manager's disutility of choosing the effort is () = 1 2  2 = 12821 units in certainty equivalent measure, which is 2.10% of the average market value of firms. Given the binding individual rationality condition at equilibrium and normalizing the manager's reservation utility to zero, we infer that the average compensation of the manager is no smaller than his disutility of choosing the effort (see equation (A.1) in Appendix 1). This calibration result further indicates that the executive compensation accounts for at least 2.10% of the average market value of firms. To put this value in perspective, Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005) report that top-executive compensation amounted to about 5% of the companies' net income for This ratio suggests that about 1.81% of the variation in stock returns is predictable at the oneyear horizon, which is consistent with empirical findings from the stock market return predictability literature. We obtain the ratio  0 = 30330−4, and in turn, we calculate the variance of liquidity orders   = 209477, implying that 20.19% of the variation in total orders is due to the liquidity orders. Finally, the ratio of the reservation value of being an informed trader to the underlying cash flow variance,  0 , is 36957 − 5, implying that the reservation value to become an informed trader is 225.25 units. Because the reservation value and the profit of informed trading are equal in equilibrium, we infer that the profit of informed trading is also 225.25 units, which is translated into about 4.18% of the average market value of firms.
Welfare Analysis
Our model sheds light on the connection between the stock market efficiency and the economic efficiency. We view the stock market efficiency in terms of information production in the stock market, and the economic efficiency in terms of social welfare improvement. Dow and Gorton (1997) show that the stock market helps improve economic efficiency by providing more information to guide investment decisions. We focus on the stock market's role in structuring managerial incentives. We conduct the following numerical analysis to illustrate the economic significance of this information production channel.
In our model the information-based trading determines the amount of the information content in stock prices. We conduct a comparative static analysis by allowing the underlying uncertainty At equilibrium, the manager's ex-ante utility is fixed at   =   , and the principal's ex-ante 
For the welfare analysis, we examine the following two scenarios:
1.  =  0 , where  0 is the initial equilibrium number of informed traders in the stock market.
This corresponds to the case where the stock market produces information, but the amount of produced information is fixed. This situation may also resemble the case where some legal or institutional rules are in place to prohibit any potential trader from becoming an informed trader except the  0 existing informed traders.
2.  changes according to equation (3) as the cash flow uncertainty changes, which corresponds to the case where a greater uncertainty attracts more information-based stock trading.
Let  1 and  2 represent the levels of social welfare in Scenarios 1 and 2, respectively. We calculate  1 and  2 using the baseline values of the parameters in Table 1 . Figure 2 , Panel A graphs the two social welfare levels against percentage increases in the underlying uncertainty.
The dashed and solid lines stand for  1 and  2 , respectively. Both  1 and  2 are strictly downward-sloped, indicative of a tradeoff between the social welfare and uncertainty for a given level of information production. The information enhancement effect is strictly dominated (Proposition 2), leading to an overall risk-incentive tradeoff as well as a negative risk-welfare relation. Strictly dominated as it is, the information enhancement effect contributes to a significant welfare improvement. In the figure, the  2 curve tops the  1 curve, and the gap widens as the uncertainty mounts. Starting from the same initial level,  2 exceeds  1 by 9.80% when   doubles, and by 17.14% when   triples.
To measure the social welfare improvement due to the information enhancement, we compute the difference between the decline in  2 and the decline in  1 as a result of the increases in 
Empirical Analysis
To offer more direct evidence, we empirically study in this section the impact of information-based stock trading on CEO incentives and the risk-incentive relation.
Data and Variables
Data for this empirical study are from several sources. CEO compensation data are from the the detailed discussions of this regression (i.e., equation (14)). We calculate the change in CEO's firm-specific wealth ( ), in thousands of dollars, as the sum of total direct flow compensation, value realized from exercising options, and changes in value of CEO holdings of options and stocks.
The ExecuComp database reports total direct flow compensation, which is the sum of salary, bonus, Black-Scholes value of stock option grants, restricted stock grants, long-term incentive plan payouts, and other annual compensation; the change in value of stock holdings is computed as the beginning-of-year value of CEO's stock holdings multiplied by the current year's inflation-adjusted annual stock return (  ); the change in value of stock options equals the product of option deltas, calculated using Core and Guay's (1999) method, and the change in the firm's market value after adjusting for the share percentage represented by existing stock options. To obtain the change in a firm's shareholder value ( ) for a given year, we first obtain the firm value (  ), in million dollars, as the product of fiscal year-end stock price and the total number of shares outstanding, and we then calculate   as that year's inflation-adjusted annual stock return ( ) multiplied by the beginning-of-year firm value. Thus,   is the dollar return to shareholders and measures the firm's performance. Murphy, 1999). We calculate the stock-based pay-performance sensitivity    as the fraction of the firm the CEO owns plus the fraction of the firm's stocks on which the options are written times the options' deltas, and multiplied by 1,000. Table 2 Table 2 presents summary statistics of the two key variables. Notably,   is severely skewed to the right.
We also construct a set of firm-specific and CEO-specific control variables which are known to 13 We thank one referee for suggesting the use of the adjusted PIN measure. Note that our paper is not about whether and which component of PIN is priced in cross section. In fact, Duarte and Young (2009) show that liquidity effects unrelated to information asymmetry explain the relation between PIN and the cross-section of expected returns as documented in Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O'Hara (2002).
correlate with heterogeneity in pay-performance sensitivities. To control for institutional influence, we define    as the total institutional share holdings in proportion of the total number of shares outstanding, and 5 as the proportion of total institutional share holdings by the top five institutional investors in the firm. To measure a firm's growth opportunity, we calculate Tobin's Q ( ) as the ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets. We obtain the market value of assets as the book value of assets (data 6) plus the market value of common equity (data 25 times data 199) less the book value of common equity (data 60) and balance sheet deferred taxes (data 74). To capture the effects of a firm's investment policy and capital structure on CEO incentives, we compute the investment-to-capital ratio ( ) as capital expenditure (data 128) divided by fixed assets (data 8), and the leverage ratio ( ) as the sum of short-term debt (data 34) and long-term debt (data 9) divided by the sum of short-term and long-term debt and stockholders' equity (data 216). Further, to characterize the impact of a firm's financial constraints on CEO incentives, we follow Kaplan and Zingales (1997) 
to construct the KZ index (). Other control variables include CEO tenure ( ), and dummies for each year and each industry (). To capture the potential nonlinear relation between CEO incentives
and CEO tenure, we use the logged value of the CEO's tenure (  ) in our empirical analysis. Table 2 summarizes these control variables except .
Hypothesis and Econometric Strategy
Our model predicts that two effects arise in response to an increase in the fundamental uncertainty.
Apart from directly reducing incentives, a rise in uncertainty (or risk) encourages information-based trading in the stock market, which increases the information content of the stock price and in turn, improves incentives.
Decomposition of PIN
As shown in our model, the amount of information-based trading is not merely related to risk.
Other factors such as liquidity, noisiness of private signals, and the reservation value of becoming informed traders also affect the information-based trading and consequently CEO incentives. The empirical measure of information-based stock trading,  , may contain components which help improve CEO incentives but are unrelated to risk. To address this concern, we separate   into two components, one related to risk and the other not, by running the following cross-sectional regression on a yearly basis: 14
where  is the logarithm value of a firm's market capitalization. We use the fitted values (  ) and the residuals ( ) of the year-by-year cross-sectional regressions to measure the two components of   that are related and unrelated to risk, respectively. This PIN decomposition model deserves a further discussion. Besides the dollar return risk measure   , we include firm size in the decomposition regressions for two reasons.
First, because our risk measure   is mechanically and positively correlated with firm size, which is well-known to significantly and negatively correlate with   (Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O'Hara, 2002), a univariate regression of   on   yields a significantly negative coefficient estimate on   . The negative loading of   on   in the univariate regression appears to be dominated by and pick up only the impact of firm size on   even though   is positively and significantly correlated with the percentage return risk measure  . 15 Therefore, we believe that in the bivariate regression like equation (13) , the coefficient estimate on   correctly captures the impact of risk on information-based trading after controlling for the (unwanted) role of firm size. Second, the current specification allows us to better gauge the economic significance of change in firm risk on information-based trading as well as incentive provision. Note that the fitted value   from equation (13) includes the firm size element which is well-known to be negatively related to pay-performance sensitivities (e.g., Schaefer, 1998). As a result, our estimation using this   measure may underestimate the impact of information-based stock trading on incentive improvement. Table 3 reports the regression results of equation (13) 14 In an earlier draft, we include the squared   instead of  in the regressions to capture the potentially non-linear relation between   and   . We retain this exercise in the current draft and the results are similar. For brevity those results are not reported and are available upon request. 15 In fact, if we run a bivariate regression of   on  and  , the coefficients estimates on  and   are significantly negative and significantly positive, respectively.   is positively correlated with firm risk after controlling for firm size: the coefficient on   is positive for almost all years except 1992. The adjusted  2  of the decomposition regression average at 0.386 over the sample period and show an increasing trend, jumping from below 0.40 in the 1990s to over 0.60 after 2000.
Econometric Models
Using the two   components, we follow Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) to specify our main econometric model as follows:
In this specification,   and   represent respectively the information-based stock trading related and unrelated to firm risk;  includes the set of control variables such as Equation (14) implies that we can calculate the pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) as:
In equation (15), the coefficient  1 reflects the direct effect of firm risk on CEO incentives and is expected to be negative. The coefficient  2 captures the effect of risk-related information-based trading on CEO incentives, which we interpret as an indication of the indirect effect of risk on CEO incentives through information-based stock trading. This coefficient is the parameter of interest and is expected to be positive based on our model prediction. The coefficient  3 characterizes the effect on CEO incentives of the information-based trading not accounted for by risk, and we do not have a clear prediction about its sign. Here, a significantly positive  2 and a significantly negative  1 suggest the offset against risk-incentive tradeoff driven by the risk-related component of information-based stock trading. Thus, the overall risk-incentive relation based on equation (14) is equal to  1 +  2     . Accordingly, the size of the offset is measured as the absolute value of
. Table 2 shows clear evidence on the presence of extreme outliers in the data, particularly on CEO compensation   , firm risk   , and pay-performance sensitivity   . Consequently, we winsorize each of the three variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles. To further reduce the impact of outliers on estimations, we follow Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) and estimate equation (14) with median regressions because the method is less susceptible to large outliers than other estimators.
We compute the standard errors of parameter estimates with 20 bootstrap replications.
For robustness check, we further estimate equation (14) with fixed-effect OLS regressions. In the OLS regression, we include the CEO-firm fixed effects to control for all differences in the average level of CEO compensation; we calculate heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors and adjust for clustering at the firm level. Also, we adopt another commonly used approach in the executive compensation literature to regress the directly constructed pay-performance sensitivity    against variables of interest and control variables (e.g., Core and Guay, 1999; Jin, 2002) .
Consequently, we estimate equation (15) with both median regressions and CEO-firm fixed-effect OLS regressions. Table 4 presents the estimation results for the two models, with Columns 1-2 corresponding to equation (14) and Columns 3-4 to equation (15) . We start with the median regression results for equation (14) . The coefficient estimate on the firm risk   is negative and significant at the 1% level, consistent with the standard agency theory. The coefficient estimate on   is positive and significant at the 1% level, indicating that the risk-related information-based trading is associated with a higher level of CEO incentives. The coefficient on   is positive and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that the non-risk-related component of information-based stock trading improves CEO incentives as well. The median regression results also show that CEO incentives are positively related to aggregate and concentrated institutional holdings, growth opportunities, investment expenditure, and CEO tenure, and are negatively related to financial constraints and leverage ratio. These results are largely in line with the findings in the literature.
Empirical Results
The two parameters of interest are the coefficients on   and   as the overall risk-incentive relation based on equation (14) is equal to  1 + 2     . Table 3 reports that the average loading of   on   is 9.39e-7, that is,     = 939 − 7. Given a negative coefficient estimate on   and a positive coefficient estimate on   in our main econometric model, we can infer that there are two effects of firm risk on CEO incentives. The increase in firm risk directly reduces CEO incentives, as captured by the coefficient  1 ; and the increase in firm risk also indirectly enhances CEO incentives, which is characterized by the coefficient  2 .
The magnitude of the offset effect is captured by We also estimate equation (14) using the OLS regression, in which we include an CEO-firm fixed effect, calculate heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors, and adjust for clustering at the firm level. We proceed to examine the estimation results for equation (15) . The results are similar. For example,    is significantly and negatively related to firm risk   , supporting the riskreturn tradeoff predicted by the standard agency theory.    is significantly and positively correlated with both the risk-related informed trading and the risk-unrelated informed trading, indicating that the information-based trading helps improve CEO incentives. The offset effect implied from estimates of equation (15) 
Summary and Conclusions
In this paper we investigate the role of information-based stock trading in affecting the risk-incentive relation. We construct a parsimonious principal-agent model that combines information-based stock trading with optimal contracting. The information content in stock price is endogenously determined and depends only on trading characteristics. We analytically decompose the equilibrium impact of risk on incentives into two offsetting effects. The direct effect measures the standard riskincentive tradeoff given a level of information-based trading; and the indirect effect reflects incentive enhancement due to the risk-related information-based stock trading. This information-production channel has so far been largely overlooked in the incentive literature.
Using real-world executive compensation data and stock market data, we calibrate the model we find that the risk-related information-based trading can offset the risk-incentive tradeoff by 43% to 81%.
Our study not only highlights the important and under-studied role of the risk-related information-based stock trading in strengthening executive incentives but also generates useful managerial implications. In particular, our findings suggest that incentive pay may still be useful in an uncertain environment if the underlying stock trading is informative enough. The principals (i.e., boards of directors) thus should make an effort to promote information-based trading and incorporate trading characteristics (e.g., liquidity, stock price informativeness, structure of investor base, changes in positions of key institutional investors, etc.) into the contracting process. Our results also imply that incentive pay may not work in an environment in which higher risk and lower stock market information production co-exist.
Appendix 1: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1: We set up the principal's problem as follows:
where   is the reservation utility to the manager. Given the compensation contract  =  +  +  (as specified in equation (4)), the manager solves the following problem:
The first-order condition yields
We therefore have equation (7). At equilibrium, the manager's individual rationality condition should be binding, which yieldŝ
With  = +  + , the principal's problem can be rewritten as
Substitute   for  and equation (A. 4) for. The above problem is therefore simplified as
The first-order conditions yield
We immediately obtain from equation (A. 7)
 () back into equation (A. 6), we obtain
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2: Using the implicit function theorem, we have:
Proof of Lemma 3:
We then conclude that  ( ) =  2   , and clearly,
Proof of Proposition 1: Using the results from proof of Lemma 3 and applying the total differentials, we immediately obtain
where   and  are defined as in equation (10) and equation (11), respectively. To show that  ( )    0, we need to show that    . That is,
This holds as the coefficient of each term in  is larger than that of its corresponding term in .
Step 2. Defining  ( ) ≡  ( )(1 −  2 ), and using the proof of Lemma 3 (available in Appendix 1 of the online supplement), we derive that
Combining equation (6) with equation (A. 12), we obtain
Given , , ,  and   , we solve for  from equation (A. 13).
Step 3. Using  =  + P  =1 (  ) + , we derive
which yields
We then obtain .
Step 4. We rewrite equation (3) as
from which we calculate .
Step 5. Given these calibrated parameter values, we recalculate  ( ) from equation (A. 12), and then we calculate  from equation (6) . We use step 5 to check for the convergence of the calibration. If the value of  calculated from step 5 is significantly different from the chosen initial value  in step 1, then we pick another initial value  and repeat step 1 to step 5 until the two values are close to each other (with a difference less than 1e-10). We calibrate our model's parameters based on a sample that is formed from merging the CRSP, Compustat, ExecuComp, and Thomson Financial's Institutional Holding databases over the period from 1992 to 2005, containing 2,692 firms and 24,577 firm-year observations. Panel A presents summary statistics of the data relevant to the calibration analysis. We obtain the firm value (in millions of 2005 constant dollars) as the product of fiscal year-end stock price and the total number of shares outstanding. We measure the uncertainty in firm value for a given year by a firm's standard deviation of shareholder dollar returns, which we compute as the annualized percentage standard deviation of the past five-year monthly stock returns multiplied by the beginning-of-year firm value (in millions of 2005 constant dollars). We obtain trading volume (in millions of shares) for a fiscal year as the volume of a firm's common shares traded within a calendar year corresponding to the fiscal year, and we calculate the volatility in trading volume as the time-series standard deviation in trading volume for the firm over the sample period. We obtain the number of institutional investors from the Thomson Financial's Institutional Holding database. We measure incentives by a CEO's direct ownership of stocks and stock options. Panel B reports the baseline values of calibrated parameters/variables. We obtain the firm value (  , in millions of dollars) as the product of fiscal year-end stock price and the total number of shares outstanding. We denote by  the logarithm value of firm value. We calculate the change of firm value ( ) in a given year as that year's inflation-adjusted annual stock returns (   ) multiplied by the beginning-of-year firm value (in millions of dollars). We measure risk by a firm's standard deviation of shareholder dollar returns (  ), and we compute   of a given year as the annualized standard deviation of the past five-year inflation-adjusted monthly stock returns (   ) multiplied by the beginning-of-year firm value (in millions of dollars). We use Duarte and Young's (2009) adjusted probability of informed trading ( ) measure, which is developed from an extended version of Easley, et al.'s (1996) structural microstructural model, to measure the amount of information-based stock trading. The two variables,   and  , are separately the fitted values and residuals from year-byyear cross-sectional regressions of   against  and   (see Table 3 for details). We calculate aggregate institutional holding (  ) as the total institutional share holdings scaled by the total number of shares outstanding. We compute the concentrated ownership (5) as the top-five institutional share holdings in proportion of the total institutional share holdings. We calculate Tobin's Q ( ) as the ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets, where the market value of assets is defined as the book value of assets (data 6) plus the market value of common equity (data 25 times data 199) less the book value of common equity (data 60) and balance sheet deferred taxes (data 74). We compute the investment-to-capital ratio ( ) as capital expenditure (data 128) divided by fixed assets (data 8), and the leverage ratio ( ) as the sum of short-term debt (data 34) and long-term debt (data 9) divided by the sum of short-term and long-term debt and stockholders' equity (data 216). We follow Kaplan and Zingales (1997) to calculate the KZ index () as a measure of financial constraint. We calculate the CEO total compensation (  ), in thousands of dollars, as the sum of total direct flow compensation, value realized from exercising options, and changes in value of CEO holdings of options and stocks. The change in value of stock holdings is computed as the beginning-of-year value of CEO's stock holdings multiplied by the current year's inflation-adjusted stock return; the change in value of stock options equals the product of option deltas, calculated using Core and Guay's (1999) method, and the change in the firm's market value after adjusting for the share percentage represented by existing stock options. We compute   as a CEO's tenure as of year , and    as the logarithm value of the CEO's tenure. The stock-based pay-performance sensitivity (  ) represents incentives provided by the CEO's direct ownership of stocks and stock options, which is the fraction of the firm the CEO owns plus the fraction of the firm's stocks on which the options are written times the options' deltas, multiplied by 1,000. Here,   and  , are separately the fitted values and residuals from year-by-year cross-sectional regressions of the proxy for the amount of information-based stock trading,  , against  and   (see Table 3 for details). The control variables  include    −1 ,  5 −1 ,   −1 ,  −1 ,  −1 ,  −1 ,     , all defined in Table 2 , year dummies, and industry dummies. We estimate the two models with either median regressions or OLS CEO-firm fixed-effect regressions and report standard errors in parentheses. We calculate the standard errors in median regressions based on 20 bootstrap replications; and the heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in OLS-FE regressions adjust for clustering at the firm level. We suppress coefficient estimates on year dummies and industry dummies for brevity. The sample period is 1993-2005. *, **, *** stand for statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
